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[L. A. No. 25150. In Bank. Mar. 2,1959.] 
WILLIAM B. McKESSON, as District Attorney of the· 
County of Los Angeles, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH M. LOW-
ERY, as Auditor of the County of Los Angeles, Re-
spondent. 
[1] Public Officers-Oompensation-Increasing Compensation.-In 
view of the presidential proclamation tenninating hostilities 
in the Korean War, the operation of Const., art. XI, § 5, pro-
hibiting increase of an officer's compensation after his election 
or during his term of office, and a county charter provision 
that compensation of any elective county or township officer 
should not be increased or diminished during the term for ' 
which he was elected or within 90 days preceding his elec-
tion, is no longer suspended pursuant to Gov. Code, I§ 53070, 
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[2a, 2b] Id. - Oompensation - IncreasiDg Oompensation.-Const., 
art. XI, I 5, prohibiting increase of an officer's compensation 
after his election or during his term of office, and a county 
charter provision that compensation of any elective county 
or township officer should not be increased or diminished d~ 
ing the term for which he was elected or within 90 days pre-
ceding his election, apply to an officer who is appointed to flll I 
an unexpired term of office, but not to one who is elected to 
fill the term; they do not prohibit a salary increase for an 
officer elected to flll an unexpired term where the increase. is 
adopted a sufficient time prior to the election to comply with 
any local provisions. 
[3] Statutes-ConstructIon-Legislative Intent.-It is a funda-
mental mle of statutory constmction that the statute be 
scmtinized in the light of the legislative intent. 
[1] See Cal.,Jur.2d, Public Officers, § 174. 
McX. Dig. References: [1,2, 4-6] Public Officers, § 110(1); [3] 
Statutes, § 114. 
) 
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[4] Public Officers - Compensation - Increasing CompeDBation.-
One primary purpose of the prohibition against increases in 
an officer's compensation is to prevent office holders from 
using tbeir influence and position to secure salary increases 
after they have been elected, and this danger is not present 
where the increase in salary has been adopted in the portion 
of the term preceding the election of one who is to fill an un-
expired term. 
[5] Id.-CompeDSation-Increasing Compeusa.tioD.-Petitioner was 
entitled to payment of the salary increase which became effec-
tive after his IIppointment to the office of district attorney 
but prior to his subsequent election to that office for the un-
expired term of his predecessor, especially where the salary 
ordinance was enacted some nine months prior to the time of 
election. 
[6] Id.-Oompeusa.tion-Increasin.g Oompeusa.tioD.-An appointee 
to an unexpired term of office stands in the same shoes as his 
predecessor and, although the dllUger of undue influence on 
the salary-authorizing body is not as great with an appointee 
as with an incumbent officer, the danger is nonetheless suffi-
cient to . warrant imposition of constitutional and charter 
prohibitions against increase in compensation during his term 
of office. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a county auditor to 
pay a salary increase for a district attorney elected to fill the 
unexpired term of his predecessor. Writ granted. 
William B. McKesson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), 
in pro per., for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Wil-
liam E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, and Donald' K. 
Byrne, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-The question presented by this petition for a 
writ of mandate is whether petitioner is entitled to payment of 
the salary increase which became effective after his appoint-
ment to the office of district attorney of Los Angeles County 
but prior to his subsequent election to that offit'e f-or the unex-
pired term of his predecessor. The factual situation presented 
by the petition is as follows: 
On June 5. 1956, S. Ernest Roll was elf'Cted DiRtrict Attor-
ney of Los Angeles County for a four-~'ear term which was 
to ('ommence on tbe first Monday in December of 1956. Mr. 
Roll di('d on October 26, 1956. On De~ember 4, 1956, which 
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was after Mr. &11 's term was to commence, William B. lrIc~ 
Kesson, petitioner herein, was appointed to the office of district -
attornp~·. He was to hold office until the election and qualifi-
('ation of his successor. (Los Angeles County Charter, § 16.) 
At the npxt general election, which was in June, 1958, peti. 
tioner was elected for a two-year term, the balance of Mr. 
Roll's unexpired term. 
The salary for district attorney at the time of petitioner's 
appointment was $23,000 per year. In September, 1957, an 
ordinance was passed increasing the salary to $25,000 per' 
year. After his election petitioner requested Joseph M. 
Lowery, the auditor of Los Angeles County, to enter the salary 
change on the county records and to pay him accordingly .. 
The request was refused, and now petitioner seeks a writ of 
mandate to compel the county auditor to pay his salary at the 
increased rate. 
Article XI, section 5, of the California Constitution pro-'! 
vides that "the compensation of any county, township or mu- . 
nicipal officer shall not be increased after his election or during 
his term of office ... ." Section 52 of the Los Angeles County 
Charter provides that "the compensation of any elective 
county or township officer shall not be increased or diminished 
during the term for which he was elected, nor within ninety 
days preceding his election." . 
[1] Petitioner contends that, since the President of the 
United States has not proclaimed the termination of hostilities 
in the Korean War, the operation of the above provisions is 
still suspended pursuant to sections 53070 and 53071 -of the 
Government Code, and he is entitled to the increased salary . 
from the effective date of the ordinance authorizing it, Octo-
ber 18, 1957. Section 53071 suspended the operation of provi-
sions prohibiting the increase of compensation of elective. 
officers during time of war as defined by section 53070. This 
contention has recently been answered adversely in Rapp v. 
Gibson, Q.nte, p. 467 [334 P.2d 575]. 
[2a] Petitioner next contends that the constitutional and 
'!llarter provisions, although precluding his receiving the in-
tlreased salary during his appointive term, do not so preclude 
him during his elective term. These' provisions, petitioner 
claims, apply to an officer who is appointed to fill an unexpired 
term of office, but not to one who is elected to fill the term. 
It is our opinion that this contention is correct. 
[3] It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that 
the statute be scrutinized in the light of the legislative intent. 
Mar. 1959] McKESSON tI. LOWERY 
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[4] 11. is clear that one of the primary purposes of the pro-
hibitions against increases ill cOlllpcnsation is to prevent office 
holders from using their influence and position to secure 
salary increases after they llave been elected. (Rutledge v. 
City of Eureka, 195 Cal. 404, 419 [234 P. 82].) Where the 
increase in salary has been adopted in the portion of the 
term preceding the eleetion of the one who is to fill the unex-
p'ired term, this danger is not present. Whether a candidate 
is elected is a matter subject to the public will. The candidate 
himself, of course, cannot be certain of the outcome of the 
election, and it would indeed be an optimistic candidate who 
attempted to procure a salary increase for the position to which 
he is seeking election. 
[5] The facts of the present case demonstrate the absence 
of the danger against which the prohibitions are directed. 
The salary ordinance was enacted some nine months prior to 
the time of the election. While at that time the petitioner 
may have decided to become a candidate, he could not know 
what opposition he would have or what the election results 
would be. To attempt to secure a salary increase at that time 
would be the result of mere wishful thinking. 
[2b] There is no need to give the provisions here involved 
any interpretation broader than that necessary to accomplish 
their obvious purpose. We hold, therefore, that article XI~ 
section 5, of the California Constitution, and section 52 of the 
Los Angeles County Charter do not prohibit a salary increase 
for an officer elected to fill an unexpired term, where the 
increase is adopted a sufficient time prior to the election to 
comply with any local provisions. Petitioner is therefore en-
; titled to the increased salary from and after July 1, 1958. 
. Respondent has cited Larew v. Newmml, 81 Cal. 588, 590 
: [23 P. 227] ; Storke v. Goux, 129 Cal. 526 [62 P. 68] ; Harrison 
v. Colgan, 148 Cal. 69 [82 P. 674] ; and Robbills v. Lambert, 
43 Cal.App.2d 463 [111 P.2d 5], as controlling authority in 
this case. Those cases are distinguishable in that they involved 
persons appointed, not l'lected, to an unexpired term. [6] An 
appointee stands in the same shoes as his predecessor. More-
o over, although the danger of undue influence on the salary-
authorizing body is not as great with an appointee as it is 
with an incumbent officer, the danger is nonethetess sufficient 
enough to warrant imposition of the constitutional and charter 
prohibitions. 
Let the writ issue directing respondent to pay to petitioner 
_the increased salary for the office of district attorney of Los , 
) 
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Angeles County commencing with the term for which peti-
tioner was elcct"cl on June 3, 1958. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Since 1899 the courts of this state have consistently held 
that the phrase "his term of office" in article XI, section 5, 
of the California Constitution means, not the period during 
which the incumbent holds the officc, but the full period of 
time prescribed by law for the office. (Larew v. N ewmall, 
81 Cal. 588, 590 [23 P. 227] ; Storke v. 001(3:, 129 Cal. 526, 527 
[62 P. 68]; Harrison v. Colgan, 148 Cal. 69, 73-75 [82}>. 
674] ; Robbins v. Lambert, 43 Cal.App.2d 463, 465 [111 ·P.2d 
5] .) Accordingly, there cannot be any increase in salary 
during the statutory term "regardless of the fact that different 
persons may successively hold for successive parts of the term, 
so that one who is elected or appointed after a part of such 
term has expired cannot have an increase made after the term 
began, though prior to his election or appointment." (Harri-· 
80n v. Oolgan, supra, 148 Cal. at 75.) . 
Under these cases the "term of office" herein is that to 
which Mr. Roll was elected, l and the salary ordinance, enacted 
after that term commenced, cannot take effect until the com-
mencement of the next term of office in 1960. The majori~y 
opinion nevertheless holds that the ordinance became effec~. 
tive on July 1, 1958, the date that petitioner commenced servo 
ing the part of the unexpired term for which he was elected .. 
It does not overrule the foregoing cases, but seeks to distin· ; 
guish them on the ground that they apply only to persons . 
appointed and not to those elected for an unexpired term. 
I regard this distinction as meretricious. The express appli •. 
cation of section 5 of article XI of the Constitution to "any" . 
county officer precludes any implication that only appointed· 
officers are included in its prohibition or that the phrase "his 
term of office" has one meaning for elected officers and a quite 
different meaning for appointed officers or varies in meaning 
according to whether the officer is elected or appointed for the 
full regular term of the office or for all unexpired part thereof. 
The section no more permits the exclusion from its operation 
'Section 13 of the Los Angeles County Charter provides that the term 
of office for district attorney" shall be four years, beginning at noon of 
the tlrst Monday in December following the election, and ending at Doon 
on the first Monday in Decemuer four years thereafter." 
Mar. 1959] McKERSON tJ. LoWERY 
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of officers elected for part of a regular term than it permits 
the exclusion of those elected for the full regular term. Nor 
can such di8tinctions be drawn from the purpose of the stat-
ute. Courts have often declared that the purpose of such a 
constitutional prohibition is to preclude an officer's using his 
position to obtain increased compensation during his term of 
office as well as "unwarranted demands upon the public treas-
ury resulting from a possible concert of action between public 
officers or expectant candidates for public office." (Rutledge 
Y. City of Eureka, 195 Cal. 404, 419 [234 P. 82].) These reasons 
apply as forcefully to an officer subsequently elected as to one 
subsequently appointed to an unexpired term. (See Harrison 
v. Colgan, supra, 148 Cal. 69, 73, 75, 78; Lancaster v. Board 
of Commissioners, 115 Colo. 261 [171 P.2d 987, 989, 166 A.L.R. 
839] ; Clark v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 286 [88 P.2d 542, 545] ; 
Thornsberry v. City of Campbell (Mo.App.), 274 S.W. 847, 
848; Wilson v. Shaw, 194 Iowa 28 [188 N.W. 940, 941-942],) 
In my opinion the result reached in this case can be justified 
only hy discarding the long established interpretation of the 
crucial phrase, "his term of office." (Italics added.) Were 
we interpreting this phrase for the first time, I should be 
disposed to view it as a reference to the term that the officer 
actually serves. Nevertheless, I would be reluctant to overrule 
the established interpretation in view of its still current plaus-
ibility, enhanced by its long standing. So long as it thus 
continues acceptable, the serviceable consistency of stare 
decisis should discourage its displacement. I would not under-
mine that consistency, while purporting to follow the prece-
dents, by freighting the established interpretation with a dis-
tinction between elected and appointed officers that compels 
inequality in the application of the law. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
